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Abstract
This paper examines the effects- of exchange-rate policies when indi-
viduals maximize lifetime utility on the basis of rational expectations
about the future. The institutional framework is a small economy in which
the central bank holds the exchange rate fixed at each moment in time, but
-allows it to depreciate over time according to a pre-announced schedule.
In this setting, an unanticipated, discrete devaluation of the cur-
rencyhas no real effects. It occasions only a tranfer of interest-bearing
foreign assets from the public to the central hank. An unanticipated,
permanent increase in the rate of devaluation, in contrast, causes a
sharp fall in consumption, a current-account surplus, and a long-run de-
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(212) 280-5510This paper examines the effects of exchange-rate policies when individ-
uals maximize lifetime utility on the basis of rational expectations about
the future. The economy studied is one in which the authorities allow free
mobility of capital under a crawling-peg exchange-rate regime. Many indus-
trializing economies have adopted a crawling peg as a means of reconciling
disparate inflation rates at home and abroad, and some recent efforts to use
the rate of crawl as an instrument of anti-inflation policy have attracted
considerable interest (see Carlos D1az Alejandro). Tools similar to those em-
ployed here have been applied by Guillermo Calvo (1979a) to study this type of
exchange-rate management under conditions of capital immobility.
An advantage of the explicit optimization framework is the light it throws
on the interaction between private economic decisions and the balance sheets of
the government and, particularly, the central bank. Although the literature on
open-economy financial policy has largely ignored such considerations--the ex-
ceptions include papers by Alan Stockman and myself (1979, 1980a)--the extent
to which the public internalizes official asset holdings has obvious conse-
quences for the efficacy of official intervention in asset markets. An impli-
cation of the model explored below is that the stock of central-bank reserves,
when allowed to earn interest, will be perceived by the public as part of its
own wealth. In this setting, devaluation loses its real effects, for a dis-
crete rise in the price of foreign exchange occasions a proportional issue of
central-bank money, a transfer of interest-bearing foreign bonds from the public
to the bank, and nothing more.
The optimization hypothesis, as applied here, eliminates the inde-
terminacy typically associated with models assuming rational expectations or
perfect foresight. This is an additional advantage, as it provides a firm
ground for convergence assumptions that must usually go unjustified. The explicit
specification of agents' objective functions leads also to a natural welfare
analysis of alternative policies.2
I. The Model
The economy I consider is inhqbited by a representative household, which
derives utility from consuming a single composite commodity and holding real
money balances. Household wealth is divided between high-powered money hold-
ings (there is no banking system) and holdings of an internationally-traded
bond having a fixed foreign-currency face value. The economy is small, and
therefore can influence neither the (positive) world bond rate, P, nor the
foreign-currency price of the consumption good, P*, both of which are taken
to be fixed.l The domestic-currency price of consumption, P, is linked to
the world price by the relationship P = EP*, where E, the exchange rate, is
the price of foreign money in terms of domestic money.
The central bank causes the exchange rate to depreciate according to a pre-
announced schedule by standing ready at each instant to trade home currency for
foreign exchange on the pre-announced terms. This type of exchange-rate regime
has been studied, in somewhat different contexts, by Calvo (1979a, 1979b), Paul
Krugman, Jorge de Macedo, Carlos Rodriguez, Sweder van Wijnbergen, and others.
It is assumed that the official schedulecalls for a constant, non-negative rate
.
of devaluation,E, which must equal the domestic inflation rate, Pip, at all times.
The representative household's instantaneous utility function is written
as Ut = u(ct,mt ), where ct is the family's consumption rate and mt represents
its nominal money holdings, M t , deflated by Pt. The function u(·,·) is posi-
tive, twice continuously differentiable, increasing in both its arguments, and
strictly concave. Both consumption and money services are normal goods.
~~ximization of the functional
(1)
ois the household's lifetime objective. -llt e is the discount factor
3




When 0 - 0,
5
e-,1t -ot e
the household's instantaneous rate of discount at time s.
a constant, for all s, we have the usual discount factor,
But to enable the economy to attain a stationary state at
the constant world interest rate p, I will adopt instead the approach of
Hirofumi Uzawa, in which the instantaneous discount rate at time s is a positive
function of the contemporaneous utility level:
It is convenient to endow 0(·) with the properties




for all u. The assumptions (4) facilitate solution of the household's maximiza"'-
tion problem, but are in no way intrinsic to the notion of an endogenous rate
2 of time preference.
In maximizing (1), the family is bound by three constraints. The first is
a (stock) wealth constraint, which states that marketable real assets at time t,
at, must equal the sum of real bond holdings bt and real balances:
(5)4
The second is a (flow) savings constraint,
(6)
real
where y is the economy's (fixed) output, Ltnet/transfers from the government,





The consolidated budget constraint of the government and central
bank plays a key role in the developments below. It embodies the very
important assumption that central-bank reserves earn interest at the world
rate, p. The government makes net transfer payments to domestic residents,
but does not consume goods. In the absence of interest-bearing government
debt, any excess of transfer payments over central-bank foreign interest earn-
ings must be financed by domestic credit creation. The latter will in general
be accompanied by changes in the foreign source component of the money supply,
and sO,cannot be identified with monetary growth. I assume that the level
of government transfers is continuously varied in such a way that the rate of
real domestic credit expansion equals lODe per cent of the stock of real bal-
ances at each moment. This implies a public-sector budget constraint of the form
(8)
where r t denotes the central bank's real reserve holdings at time t.5
II. The Perfect-Foresight Equilibrium Path
For any expected path {T } of transfer payments, maximization of (1)
t
subject to the constraints (5)-(7) yields the household's preferred paths
for consumption ({ct}), real balances ({mt}), and external claims ({bt}),
together with an implied path for central-bank reserves ({rt}). The econ-
omy's perfect-foresight equilibrium path has the property that {Tt }, {mt}
and {r*} are mutually consistent, in the sense that the government's budget
t .
constraint, Tt = prt
+ Emt, is satisfied at each instant.
The first step in finding this path is to derive necessary conditions
for an optimal household plan, contingent on an assumed path {Tt } of trans-
fers. 3 Using (2), one can simplify the maximization problem by a change of
variables from t to ~ in (1) and (6). The resulting Hamiltonian is
H =
u (c,m)
e(u(c,m» + A{y + pb+ T - C - Em} + y{a _ b - m},
e (u(c,m»
(9)
where A = A~ is the co-state variable and y = y~ is the Lagrange multiplier
associated with the wealth constraint. Necessary conditions for an optimal
program are
o + e'u (y + Pb + T - C - Em)
c
A =
u (0 - e' u) c (10)
u /u = E + p, m c
• dA
A = o(u) d~ = A(e(u) - p),
and the flow constraint (6). Given £ + P, (11) defines real money demand
(ll)
(12)6
as an implicit function ~ of consumption, with
~' (c) =
u - (£ + p)u cm cc
u - (£ + p)u rom cm
> o. (13)
The perfect-foresight assumption is imposed by adding to (10) - (12)
the requirement that anticipated transfers {T
t
} and actual transfers
{prt + gmt} coincide. The resulting system of diff~rential equations satisfies
both the conditions necessary foroptimality and the consistency condition
linking expected transfers and the government budget constraint. Using the
definition of 9, the system is described by the equations
u (c,cjJ(c»{o(u(c,cjJ(c») - o'(u(c,cjJ(c»)u(c,cjJ(c»}
·c
o(u(c,cjJ(c») + o'(u(c,cjJ(c»)u (c,cjJ(c»(y + pf - c) c
.
A = A(8(u(c,~(c») - p),
.




where f = b + r denotes the stock of claims on foreigners owned by the coun-
try as a whole. Equation (16) displays the equilibrium rate of external
asset accumulation as the difference between national income and absorption.
It is derived by noting that ~ = b + m, while ~ must equal ; because dom-
estic credit expansion just compensates money-holders for the real deprecia-
tion of their cash balances. 4
The stationary-state levels of consumption and foreign claims are those
. .
such that A = f = O. By writing (14)-(16) as a system in c and f, and then7
taking its linear approximation in a neighborhood of this stationary state,
one obtains a graphical representation of the perfect-foresight equilibrium
path. Equation (14) implies a relationship of the form c = c(A,f); thus,
. .
c = cAA + cff - 0(c,f), (17)
. .
where (14)-(16) have been used to eliminate A, A, and f in defining 0(',').
The local linearization of (17) is
:=
u (p - o'u)o'u ¢' c m
f:"
(c - c) +
~28'(p - o'u)p c .
(f -f); (18)
in (18), a bar indicates a stationary-state value, and
f:,,=(p-C'u)(u +u ¢'-u(C'/p)u4>') cc ern c m ~ ~c"(u + u .') < o. c c m
Figure 1 d.isplays the phase portrait of the system described by (16) and (18).
The locus of points along which f = 0 is upward-sloping, with foreign
claims increasing to its right and decreasing to its left. The locus along
which ~ = 0 is negatively sloped; consumption is falling above this schedule
and rising below it (for 0 < O)~
c
The stationary state (c,f) is a saddlepoint: for an initial value fo
of the predeterminedvariable, there is a unique initial consumption level Co
placing the economy on a convergent path. Any consumption level exceeding
c initiate~ a trajectory along which the intertemporal budget constraint (7) o
is violated. Such paths are infeasible, and may thus be ruled out. Paths-'
c







initiated by consumption levels below Co are feasible, but are not optimal
from the household's standpoint, given the associated path of expected
future transfer payments. The convergent trajectory can be shown to be
optimal as well as feasible. It must, therefore, be the economy's perfect~
foresight equilibrium path. For a given initial stock of external claims,
the equilibriumconsumption level is unambiguously determined.
III. Exchange-Rate Policies
To illustrate the workings of the model, I consider in this section
two types of exchange-rate policy, a one-time, unanticipated devaluation of
the currency (a discrete increase in E) and a permanent, unanticipated
increase in the rate of devaluation, E. These are the two policies compared
by Calvo (1979a) for a utility-maximizing economy in which domestic money
is the only privately-owned asset.
An unanticipated devaluation leaves the two schedules in figure I
unchanged, and has no effect on the national stock of foreign claims, which
can change only over time. The devaluation thus leaves the economy at its
long-run equilibrium position: it has no real consequences. Just as in
the traditional one-asset framework (see Rudiger Dornbusch and Calvo (1979a»,
the devaluation brings about a sharp rise in the price level and fall in
real balances. But in a setting of capital mobility, the fall in real
balances is only momentary. An incipient excess demand for money exerts
downward pressure on the exchange rate, and this forces the central bank to
intervene in the asset market, purchasing foreign bonds and issuing money
until the public's real balances have been restored to their initial level.
It is important to realize why this tranfer of bonds from the public
to the central bank reverses the wealth effect on consumption typically as-
sociated with the fall in the real value of privately-held, marketable assets
(see, e.g., Jacob Frenkel and Rodriguez). Reserves acquired by the bank9
continue to earn interest that must be returned to the public in the form
of higher transfer payments. The public, in turn, anticipates and capital-
izes this income stream, and so, perceives no change in its overall wealthwhen
real balances are again at their initial level. Accordingly, the devaluation
does not alter consumption. While there is an instantaneous increase in reserves,
there ensues no flow surplus in the halance of payments or current account.5
In contrast, an unanticipated increase in the rate of devaluation
.
does have real consequences, for it shifts the c = 0 locus. By (12), the
economy's stationary utility level u brings its rate of time preference into
equality with the world interest rate, and is thus independent of the policy pa-
rameter e. The increase in £ raises the opportunity cost of holding real
balances, inducing a long-run substitution of consumption for real balances
.
along the utility contour u. This means that the c = 0 locus must shift
to the right, as shown in figure 2. In the new stationary state, the
\
higher consumption level is financed by a higher stock of interest-bearing
foreign claims. Money is not super-neutral under the present assumptions.6
What are the characteristics of the transition path? As figure 2
shows, the saddlepath relevant after the increase in £ passes below the
original long-run equilibrium, (c,f). If the economy is initially at rest,
there is a sharp fall in consumption, from c to c~, as the new optimal
trajectory is attained. Together with the fall in the real return on money,
this occasions a drop in real money demand, acco~odated by central-bank
sales of foreign-exchange reserves to the public.
The instantaneous equilibrium (c~,f) isa position of current-account
surplus; consumption and the national stock of foreign assets grow along













(11) shows that desired real balances grow as well during the adjustment pro-
cess. The central bank accommodates this growing demand for money by continu-
ous intervention in the foreign exchange market, thereby preventing any devi-
ation of the exchange rate from its announced path and also inducing a rising
path of official.reserves. Ultimately, however, the reserves gained during
the transition do not make up for those lost during the initial portfolio
adjustment in reaction to the change in E. A higher asymptotic level of re-
serves would be inconsistent with the requirement that real balances be lower
in the new stationary state than in the original one.
This time path of reserves and consumption stands in interesting con-
trast to the one found by Calvo (1979a) in a context of capital immobility.
When there is only one asset, there can be no portfolio shift in response to
an increase in the rate of depreciation, and so a discrete fall in real bal-
ances is precluded. Rather than overshooting their eventual, lower levels,
real money and reserves decline monotonically over time. From an initial
position of long-run equilibrium, consumption must rise on impact to induce
the implied current-account deficit.
In the present setting of capital mobility, the integral of discounted
utilities, (1), is lower along the transition path following a rise in E
than it would have been along the original stationary-state path. This fol-
lows from the observation that the household's instantaneous utility falls
when E is raised, returning to its initial level only in the long run.
Thus, an increase in the rate of devaluation has a negative effect on the
welfare of economic agents.11
Footnotes
* Assistant Professor, Columbia University. I am grateful for conversa-
tions with Guillermo Calvo, and for very helpful comments from Dale Henderson
and John Taylor. Financial support from the Columbia University Council for
the Social Sciences is acknowledged with thanks.
1. The assumption that p* is constant implies that bonds are, in effect,
indexed to the consumption good.
2. My 1980 papers contain a more complete discussion of the conditions (4).
3. Again, my 1980 papers treat this type of problem in greater detail.
4. The time derivative of the nominal money supply is just the sum of
the time derivatives 0f its foreign and domestic source components, M t
= .
ptrt + EMt • It follows that mt = Mt/Pt - Emt = r t
5. These conclusions naturally require modification when reserves bear no
interest, when some international lending is denominated in domestic
currency, or when economic units have finite lives and leave no bequests.
6. This type of monetary non-neutrality has been studied by Robert Lucas and
Stanley Fischer inaggregative, closed-economy, rational-expectations models.
Portfolio substitution from money to capital provides the mechanism through
which anticipated monetary growth affects real variables.12
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